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NOTES AND *COMMENT
The court holds as sound law, the discussion of the elements neces-
sary to constitute by prescription a highway over unenclosed lands,
found in Chief Justice Dixon's dissenting opinion in Hanson v.
Taylor.6 -Dixon there says, "Title acquired by prescription and title
acquired by user, or adverse user as it is commonly called, mean the
same thing. Prescription is defined to be a mode of acquiring title
to an incorporeal hereditament by long and continued usage." He then
declares that in addition to long and continuous user the intention on
the part of the owner to dedicate the soil must positively concur when
he says, "The intention to dedicate animus dedecandi, on the part of
the owner of the soil, constitutes in every case, the foundation of the
right; and there can be no title by prescription or adverse user without
it."
The use may be regarded, rightly, as not hostile to the owner's
rights, since it makes no conflict with any interest the owner has or
does not interfere with any use he presently desires to make of it.
The extent of the custom to travel over unenclosed woodland without
asking the owners' permission repells the presumption of a grant of
the right by the owner which might otherwise arise from a long, con-
tinuous user. A mere use of a passway does not prove anything'detri-
mental to the rights of the owner and hence, will not amount to an
adverse user. Evidence of the adverse character of such use must be
shown by facts other than mere continuous user for the statutory
period.
PATRICIA RYAN
Insurance: Construction of Contracts of.-The general rule of
construction by the courts of all contracts of insurance is that while
like other contracts, they are to be so construed as to give effect to the
intention of the parties, yet where there exists any doubt as to that
intention it is always to be strictly against the insurer and in favor of
the insured.'
However, when we apply the rules of construction to the standard
policy we find that in spite of the fact that in some states insurance
contracts are required by law to be made in accordance with a statutory
form, it is now a well settled rule, that the same rules of construction
are to be applied to the terms of the statutory policy as to other
forms of policies.
We must confess that many of the decisions, rendered by the courts
of the highest jurisdictions, justify the assertion which is often made,
that courts apply a different rule.of construction to insurance con-
tracts than to other contracts.2 As a matter of law and justice, in-
surance contracts should be decided on the same basis as other con-
tracts, so as to give the full effect to the intention of the parties. But
consider the peculiar circumstances under which, insurance contracts
are made. The terms are chosen by the insurer without any consulta-
tion with the insured; the language used is ambiguous, doubtful and
23 Wis. 547.
'Definition of Wm. R. Vance, professor of George Washington University.
'Welch v. Fire Association, (Wisconsin 19o4) 98 N.W. 2z7.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
uncertain to the mind of the insured placing him in a position of amaze-
ment and bewilderment, knowing merely the bare facts, most of which
are represented by an agent. When we consider these facts we readily
know why the courts have a tendency to lean toward the insured and
against the insurer.
This very tendency was brought about by the insurance companies
at one time putting such lengthy conditions in the contract, and putting
them in such small type that it was almost impossible for the insured to
read or understand. This kind of work went to the extreme, causing
the courts to be extremely harsh and many times the courts allowed dis-
honest claims that would scarcely have been considered if the contract
had been fair upon its face.
While many of the unfair features have been eliminated by the
standard policy, still the courts, who are slow to change, haven't
swayed from their old practise of favoring the insured. It is the
duty of the court in construing these contracts to look to the intent of
the parties3 and the language employed, that is, determine what the
contract is, and in the absence of waiver, ambiguity, illegality, fraud or
mistake to construe and enforce the contract as it was intended.
In a Wisconsin case4 the court said "It is the duty of the court to
adopt that construction of the policy which, in its judgment, shall
best correspond with the intention of the parties." A southern court 5
follows this same idea and says, "Where the court can give a
policy that construction which, while preserving the protection given
the insured under its general terms, will also relieve the company
from the increased hazard against which it undertook to provide, such
construction must be adopted, for such was the evident intent of the
parties."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court states "that it is the policy of the
Pennsylvania court to arrive at the intent of the parties, by their own
interpretation of the policy, as shown by their actions."
While the courts almost universally are looking to the intent of the
parties, still they seem also almost without exception, to favor the in-
sured. An exception6 has recently been shown in the case of Hibbard
v. North American Life Inurance Co. Here the plaintiff took out a
non-participating, whole life, monthly installment policy. Part of the
policy was printed and part filled in on a typewriter. After a period
of ten years it was noticed that several errors appeared in the policy.
That is, they were errors because they were far too beneficial to the
insured; so much so that no insurance company could do business
and continue under these terms.' Plaintiff sought recovery on the
policy relying on the filled in parts of the contract, contending that
the written in portions usually control over printed portions. The
defense was the table of loan and cash surrender values. The court
held that in construing a life policy, that if the court can determine on
'French v. Fidelity, etc. Co., 135 Wis. 259, 115 N.W. 869.
'Cady v. Fidelity, etc. Co., 134 Wis. 322, 113 N.W. 967.
'Royal Ins. Co. v. Texas, etc., Ry. Co., 115 S.W. 117.
'Hibbard v. North American Life Insurance Co., (Wisconsin, March, 1927)
212 N.W. 779.
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what terms the minds of the parties met with reasonable certainty from
the nature and general contents of the contract itself, the rules of con-
struction must yield to such determination.
From this case it appears that Wisconsin courts are striking a step
forward and are allowing rules of construction to be prevailed over by
the terms of the contract, upon which the minds of the contracting
parties met, going almost entirely upon the intention of the parties.
The marked distinction is the fact that, the minds of the parties, in
the above case, did not correspond to the terms of the contract, and
the court applied that construction which apparently was intended by
the parties.
A. WATSON
Specific Performance: Mistake of Law.-.In the case of Rist v.
Porter,' both parties entered into oral agreements for conveyance of
certain real estate. The plaintiff who is the father of the defendant
agreed to convey certain lots to the defendant, and she agreed to convey
property which she inherited as sole heir of the mother to the plaintiff.
The deed to the defendant was defectively stated so as to omit I3
feet which should have gone to the defendant under the oral agree-
ment. The defendant subsequently refused to convey the land to the
plaintiff which she inherited from her-mother, the wife of the plaintiff.
Both parties af the time of making the oral agreement were of the
opinion that the plaintiff had an estate by the courtesy.in the premises
owned by the daughter. The transaction was made with that under-
standing, although in the meantime and prior thereto, the plaintiff
had remarried.
The action was begun to reform the deed given by the plaintiff to
the defendant so as to correctly describe the premises to be conveyed
thereby, and to require the defendant to convey to the plaintiff the
property which she inherited from her mother.
Rosenberry, Justice, says in part regarding the aforesaid mistake of
law:
Here the controversy is between father and daughter, both of whom acted upon
a mistaken notion as to the law governing their rights. While mistake of law
does not of itself defeat the right of the opposite party to have a contract specif-
ically performed, it may produce a situation which appeals very strongly to the
conscience of the chancellor.
He then proceeded to change the deed so as to conform with the oral
agreement and allowed the father only a life estate in the lands of
the daughter, bcause of such mistake of law.
The general rule, of course, regarding mutual mistakes of law is
that it does not give rise to any relief, as one is presumed to know
the law. This presumption has been regarded, in modern decisions,
as a violent one and the courts have, on one excuse or another given
relief, placing such mistake wherever possible as one of mistake of
fact. However, the court here has seen fit to depart from this prin-
ciple and hold that a court of equity may grant relief for mutual mis-
1212 N.W. 275 (Wis). Decided Feb. 8, 1927.
